I. INTRODUCTION
As many commentators have pointed out, the land use patterns prevalent in the United States since the advent of Euclidean-style zoning have played 1 a direct role in the development of a surprisingly broad range of problems: "[b]y fostering or requiring low density development with a high separation of uses, Euclidean zoning is one of the great generators of suburban sprawl, with all of its environmental, economic, and social costs." These costs 2 include pollution, loss of wilderness and farmland, racial and socioeconomic 34 segregation of the population, and legal obstacles to effective urban 5 rehabilitation. Moreover, in combination with prevailing patterns of local 6 funding, the socioeconomic segregation caused by Euclidean zoning perpetuates itself by channeling less well-off children into chronically underequipped public schools and stretching the resources of many urban municipalities too thin, leaving them to choose between raising property tax rates or allowing their infrastructure to decay. That devil's bargain bolsters the tendency of middle-and higher-income people to live in suburbs rather than cities, deepening the downward spiral in which many American cities find themselves. And the damage goes even further: "many current zoning practices disregard or even work against crime prevention goals" in both 7 cities and suburbs. This is particularly problematic in light of the fact that "Euclidean systems of separation-conventional zoning-have been 8 to the problem has emerged: "most of the old presumptions of Euclidean zoning have remained in place," with variances and other project-specific 13 exceptions being used to mitigate some of the problems in piecemeal fashion. As a result, however persuasive the solutions of Jacobs and later 14 thinkers may be, with few exceptions they remain theoretical: either they have not been tried in practice, or they have been implemented so recently, so tentatively, or in such a small or unique area that it is difficult to determine 15 whether they actually solve the problems caused by Euclidean zoning. This Note argues that the land use patterns that have prevailed in France for most of the last century, as well as the legal mechanisms that underlie 16 them, integrate many of the most widely accepted theories on optimal land use and thus provide a model that American urban planners can use when considering changes to their existing zoning laws. In other words, the French experience implementing a given theory of land use can illustrate whether the theory works, while the law underlying that implementation can provide guidelines on the legal and administrative framework most conducive to putting that theory into practice. Because "Paris provides one excellent model of urbanism," and because extensive information is available about it, land 18 (1996) .
19. Wickersham, supra note 2, at 553. 20. Garnett, Ordering, supra note 6, at 4. 21. The police power is, of course, "[t]he inherent and plenary power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to preserve the public security, order, health, morality, and justice." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004).
22. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 74 (1976) (quoting Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-88). In general, when the government restricts a property owner's freedom in order to prevent a public harm, it is an act of police power requiring no compensation to the owner; compensation is only required under the Takings Clause when the restriction is imposed to confer a public benefit. ROBERT R. WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL 103 (West Group, 2000) .
23. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2005) (citing Euclid for the proposition that a zoning ordinance will "survive a substantive due process challenge so long as it was not 'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.'").
use patterns in Paris and the surrounding region will be the focus of comparison. There will also be some discussion of France in general, because, as a highly centralized country with regional, national, and even transnational land use planning operating in tandem with local rules, many 18 statements about France also apply to Paris and vice-versa. Finally, a brief overview of similarities and differences between relevant French and U.S. land use law and political structures will be provided to indicate the extent to which the principles underlying French land use law are compatible with and feasible in the U.S. system.
II. EUCLIDEAN PROBLEMS
Euclidean zoning reflects a functionalist view of the city as a "machine, rather than an ever-evolving organism." The theory supports the view that 19 society functions best when cities and the surrounding land are segregated into districts that strictly limit the uses to which properties there can be put: "Euclidean zoning . . . reflects a longstanding value judgment that the appropriate way to order different land uses is to separate them from one another into single-use zones." The legal rationale for zoning is simple: 20 " [r] estrictions upon the free use of private land must find their justifications in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare." 21 22 However, while substantive due process challenges to zoning ordinances will fail unless they show the ordinance has no rational relation to the police power goals of public health, safety, or welfare, the courts have tended to stretch 23 24. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974) (quoting Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
25. For example, in New York, owners of property designated as Use Group 12B in Manufacturing Districts 2 and 3 can use their property only for "antique stores; art galleries, commercial; candy or ice cream stores; cigar or tobacco stores; delicatessen stores; jewelry or art metal craft shops; music stores; and newsstands." New York City Zoning Resolution, art. 4, ch. 2, § 42-13 (2005) , available at http:// www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/art04c02.pdf. It is unclear what police power rationale could possibly underlie such restrictions on property rights: if a commercial art gallery or a music store in this zone pose no threat to public welfare, the proposition that a non-commercial art gallery or a bookstore would pose one, and thus the justification for prohibiting it, seems difficult to support. the zoning rationale to the absolute limit: "the line 'which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of [police] power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions.'. . . But even those historic police power problems need not loom large or actually be existent in a given case." In other words, with some 24 exceptions, when it comes to zoning the police power is more or less whatever the local legislature says it is. As a result, it is common for zoning codes to define restrictions in such detail that the owner's freedom to use the property as she sees fit is reduced to almost nil.
25
In addition to the clack of a clear relationship between the police power and such narrow use restrictions, "[t]he fundamental problem with Euclidean zoning is that it . . . ignores how cities actually operate." Ample literature 26 supports the argument that the theory behind such zoning is simply wrong; 27 it has been argued that the decline of American cities and the damaging growth pattern we call sprawl "are caused by a failed regulatory code." As 28 for the environmental impact of zoning and the resultant sprawl, " [t] here is no other area in environmental law where the goals of the regulatory program are not just indifferent, but actively hostile, to the best thinking in the field."
29
Yet further, Euclidean zoning provides a legal mechanism whereby certain classes of people can be effectively barred from living in a neighborhood or even an entire municipality without that exclusion violating any recognized constitutional right. This is not a mere theoretical possibility, but a 30 statement of how zoning has been used in the ninety years since its inception;
31. For example, in February 2006, the town of Black Jack, Missouri denied an occupancy permit to an unmarried couple with three children on the grounds that they did not meet the zoning ordinance's definition of a family. This made it illegal for them to live in the home they had just bought. this Note will primarily address the racial and socioeconomic segregation perpetuated by zoning, but the same backdoor methods have been used to discriminate against gay couples and straight couples who prefer, for whatever reason, not to marry.
31
To distinguish the effects of Euclidean zoning from those of the land use law prevalent in France, this Note describes how zoning perpetuates five major problems: (1) urban sprawl; (2) racial and socioeconomic segregation; (3) environmental degradation and energy waste; (4) adverse economic impact; and (5) diminished quality of life.
A. Urban Sprawl and Decaying Cities
Urban sprawl has been defined as "low-density, land-consuming, automobile-dependent, haphazard, non-contiguous (or 'leapfrog') development on the fringe of settled areas, often near a deteriorating central city or town, that intrudes into rural or other undeveloped areas." During the 32 sprawl process, "cities' footprints . . . expand at much faster rates than population growth, creating an increasingly scattered car-dependent landscape."
This scattering of the population "requires significant As a result of urban municipalities essentially being forced to underwrite the departure of the middle class, sprawl goes hand in hand with the socioeconomic decline of America's inner cities. As the middle and upper classes moved to residential suburbs, jobs followed: suburban municipalities used zoning to turn former farmland and wilderness into commercial and industrial parks, so in the 1980s alone, "suburbs received 95% of new office jobs and 120% of net manufacturing job growth." This shift in the location 39 of offices and manufacturing plants changed urban centers from '"centers of production and distribution of material goods to centers of administration, information exchange, and higher-order service provision.' As a result, jobs remaining in the downtown core require higher levels of education, which many city residents do not possess. 46 By creating a legal framework uncannily conducive to sprawl and the 47 associated urban decline, Euclidean zoning imposes an enormous cost: it "increases development costs to the suburbs, diminishes the quality of life factors needed to sustain viable economic growth, and requires the consumption of the greatest amount of land and resources." Moreover, it 48 raises housing costs, which increases the financial strain on middle-class families while further reducing the ability of lower-income families to improve their lot in life. It also "generates traffic congestion, dependence 49 The Euclid Court apparently assumed that families unable to afford singlefamily homes were so undesirable that zoning for the express purpose of keeping such families out of middle-class neighborhoods was a reasonable government response.
Growth
It has been suggested that "the racism of the era in which [Euclid II] was decided" provides an important clue as to why a Court with "well-known objections to many forms of government economic regulation" approved a zoning system that greatly limited the rights of property owners to use their property as they saw fit. 69. "Exclusionary zoning is a common tool employed by local municipalities to exclude whatever segment of the population they deem undesirable." Michael Kling, Note, Zoned Out: Assisted-Living Facilities and Zoning, 10 ELDER L.J. 187, 198 (2002) . While exclusionary zoning in general is illegal in specific purpose of challenging the zoning ordinance, was the president of the local NAACP. But Euclid I made it possible to accomplish the same 63 discriminatory purpose more discreetly: simply removing the possibility of economic diversity within a given neighborhood went a long way towards preventing racial and ethnic minorities from moving in. Meanwhile, separating residential use from any and all economic use, rather than just from clear nuisances such as industrial compounds, obviously means there will be no businesses in the neighborhood; this means lower-income outsiders, who most likely already have no social connections in higher-income neighborhoods, no longer even have a reason to visit.
ii. Euclid's Legacy: A Great Divide
The decline of inner cities has had a disproportionate effect on minorities.
The 73. The problem with excluding duplexes is that buying a duplex and renting out half of it enables a lower-income family to get a foothold in property ownership that they might not otherwise be able to afford. See, e.g., Alex Mindlin, The Accidental Landlord, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005 (profiling a workingclass Dominican man who parlayed his first home, a dilapidated $15,000 Brooklyn duplex he purchased in 1980, into a small empire). Prohibiting duplexes cuts off this avenue to the American dream, and it does so without providing any clear benefit to neighbors, since duplexes do not inherently cause more negative impact (traffic, noise, etc.) than single-family homes. This fact can be illustrated by comparing the impact of a quiet, one-car family of three renting half their duplex to an elderly relative with the impact of a threecar family of two parents and four rowdy teenagers in a single-family house: the impact depends on the residents themselves, not on the housing type.
74 Even in more affordable areas, separating residential zones by housing type dramatically reduces the ability of lower-income people, and by extension minorities and new immigrants, to move into the area. For example, neighborhoods restricted to single-family housing prohibit not only apartment buildings but even duplexes, a housing type that enables lower-income owners to afford their mortgage by renting out half the structure. It is also common 73 to impose minimum sizes for side yards and/or to create separate zones for attached and detached single-family housing, preemptively segregating 74 families who can afford lawns from those who cannot. This is not mere coincidence; "fear of what is euphemistically called 'the inner city'-a fear that has fueled the migration to the suburbs-has been a reference to the black poor." Having set the stage for socioeconomic segregation, the Euclidean 75 approach then perpetuates it into the next generation: zoning that keeps out lower-income neighbors also helps prevent lower-income children from going to the same schools as middle-and upper-class children. Note will not dwell on them. The key point here is that the environmental effects of sprawl arise from two factors: population density and energy waste. Density, of course, is a direct result of zoning: minimum lot sizes define the density of a development. Waste of energy is more complex, but zoning in a way that obligates residents to use cars to accomplish the slightest errand is clearly more wasteful than zoning for compact neighborhoods with schools and small shops within walking distance. America is zoning for pollution and global warming; we are zoning our farmland and wilderness out of existence. 
D. Economic Impact
Jane Jacobs, one of the most famous critics of Euclidean zoning, "is an economic libertarian who believes in the creative power of the market." She 91 "criticizes the sorting out of functions into single-use districts . . . because it stifles the cross-fertilization of ideas and experiences that is so important to a city's economic and social health." Indeed, a central part of the land use 92 model she proposes "is the goal of economic diversity: the richness of business ideas and opportunities that flourish in a city. . . . 'Cities may fairly be called natural economic generators of diversity, and natural economic incubators of new enterprises.'" Her critique may sound theoretical, but it 93 rests on a solid base: Euclidean zoning and its aftereffects, namely urban sprawl and declining cities, impose costs that "can be measured in dollars." 94 It adversely impacts the economy in several ways: by distorting the real estate market; imposing massive infrastructure costs and associated tax increases; increasing the cost of housing and transportation; and reducing the ability of lower-income people-which includes, of course, not only those we normally think of as "the poor" but also many artists and budding entrepreneurs-to find work or create self-employment.
Euclidean zoning distorts the real estate market in so many ways that it manages to simultaneously conflict with conservative, libertarian, and liberal values. In addition to increasing the average price of housing, "[t]he fact 95 that a zoning map allows high density housing in some areas, only single family housing in others, only industrial and commercial use in designated locations, and high rise office buildings in downtown areas, creates great disparity in value among a city's many properties."
While incompatible with free-market principles, and since affordable housing often means some type of multi-family housing, it is also hostile to the goal of increasing the access of lower-income families to affordable housing. In addition, Euclidean zoning increases the burden on middle-class families: while the artificial scarcity of multi-family sites might be expected to reduce the cost of single-family homes by increasing the availability of single-family sites, this possibility is nullified by the tendency of suburban municipalities to require large minimum lot and house sizes. That "forces people to 99 consume land and improvements they do not want," at a higher cost than 100 they would pay were they allowed to buy only the amount of property they want. "This forced consumption is inefficient because the recipient could sell the extra land and improvements on the market for more than what they are worth to the recipient. . . ." 101 It has already been mentioned that sprawl "leads to tremendous demand for expanded public services and infrastructure, all of which cost substantially more to provide" to a scattered population than to a more compact one. The 102 problem is enormous in scope: nearly fifteen years ago, "[a] New Jersey study estimated that over a twenty-year period, capital costs associated with sprawl would exceed $1.3 billion with annual maintenance costs of over $400 million."
Single-use zoning and urban sprawl are an expensive 103 combination: a 1989 Urban Land Institute monograph estimated that "providing services to a three unit per acre development located ten miles from central facilities and employment centers" would cost $48,000-in 1989 dollars-while "[t]he same costs for a home in a twelve-unit per acre development, located closer in with an equal mix of townhouses, garden apartments and single family [homes], would be 50% lower." Current land-105. Glendening, supra note 84, at 1496. 106. Dietderich, supra note 9, at 32. 107. In addition to the fact that renting out a room in one's home might be considered an impermissible business activity, the right of a homeowner to do so depends on the local zoning code's definition of "family." For example, in Pittsburgh, no more than three unrelated people can live together in a single-family home, and they can only do so if they "share[] common facilities as considered reasonably appropriate for a family related by blood, marriage or adoption." PITTSBURGH, PA, ZONING CODE art. 9, ch. 926, § 76(b) (2006). Thus a homeowner who already has two relatives in his house cannot take in a boarder, and a boarder who does not share use of the kitchen is unlawful.
108 transport is inadequate, their only hope is to find work within walking distance, but zoning removed that option long ago.
111
In cities zoning thus "encourage[s] the concentration of poverty," which is "economically significant if, as some argue, it creates destructive 'feedback' effects such as abandonment cycles, landlord milking, speculative disinvestment, and 'red-lining.'" And people living in city centers are not 112 the only ones affected: "zoning that is too rigorous can actually destroy the possibility of employment in a suburb." The former governor of Maryland,
113
Parris Glendening, who spearheaded that state's Smart Growth policy, implicitly criticized single-use zoning when he noted "the importance of developing housing opportunities in proximity to real job opportunities."
114

E. Reduced Quality of Life
Although quality of life has no legal definition, it can fairly be called a hot topic, and as a result some general parameters have emerged.
Good 115 quality of life is associated with the presence in one's everyday life of positive factors such as health, pleasant surroundings, fulfilling work and educational opportunities, satisfying recreational activities, proximity to friends and loved ones, and, of course, enough time to enjoy these positive factors. Bad quality of life is associated with the presence of negative factors such as crime, pollution, and anything else that could be described as the opposite of a positive factor: poor health, lack of time, etc. While quality of life is obviously important for individuals, its importance to the city, region and state should not be underestimated: it is emerging as a critical factor in the postmillennial economy. rediscovered Jacobs's objection to zoning laws' segregation of land uses." 131 They contend that Euclidean fragmentation of uses is detrimental to safety, to residents' sense of community, and to economic vitality; in designing the 132 most livable, efficient cities, then, "the challenge is to zone actively for density and a mixture of uses." Smart Growth, meanwhile, is not a type of 133 city design but a way of organizing overall development at the regional level. It "envisions a reduction in the extension of low-density suburban subdivisions as the predominant pattern of development [,] . . . embrac [ing] policies that target infrastructure subsidies to designated growth areas and that direct government investments to . . . renovation and revitalization [rather than] . . . new development on the suburban periphery." 134 The two approaches support and amplify each other. Because a major premise of Smart Growth is that "[o]nly through revitalizing urban centers can growth be accommodated without further urban sprawl and a rising threat to the urban ecology," the urban center it advocates is essentially a New can no longer deliver either affordable or accessible housing without terrible traffic congestion and that cities failing to adopt Smart Growth systems will miss out on economic development and the sought-for opportunities that come with growth."
A land-use code that followed Smart Growth principles, 138 then, would "permit accessory buildings to be used as dwellings, dwelling unit types to be mixed, home occupations and live or work units, and housing in commercial zones." It would be designed to achieve a "balanced urban The potential benefits to the environment and the economy are clear, and it has also been argued that implementing Smart Growth and New Urbanism together is "the best feasible strategy for reforming American urban design and rejuvenating its cities and suburbs . . . [while also] offering minority and poor communities the best opportunity for enhanced access to employment, community destinations, and an improved urban living environment." 141 Whether these arguments are true or not cannot be demonstrated by any American city, because zoning law and local government structure have hampered efforts to implement these ideas; existing Smart Growth efforts are pilot projects established too recently to show definitive results, and true New Urbanism has not been tried on a large scale, since "most communities enact New Urbanism on a parcel-by-parcel basis through an overlay zoning amendment enacted at the developer's request." But "[t]he New Urbanist 142 approach is really not new; it comes from observations of cities that work." 143 We now turn to one such city: Paris.
IV. THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE
A. Smart Growth Is Normal; New Urbanism Is Nothing New i. Lack of Urban Sprawl and Inner-City Decline
Paris is the capital of Ile-de-France, a region covering 4,648 square miles with a population of 10,952,011. That leaves only 20% of the region-929.6 square miles-as land used for housing, industry and commerce, infrastructure, etc., which gives the region a much higher density of 11,781 people per square mile. Interestingly, Manhattan, which as an island measuring under twenty-three square miles is by far the most densely populated city in America, is much denser than Paris: it houses 66,429 people per square mile, while Paris intra muros houses 149 52,387. New York thus manages to have both extreme population density 150 at its core and sprawl everywhere else. In contrast, despite its population density, the Paris region is not a stifling megalopolis surrounded by empty land. Big-city life is obviously an option for residents interested in that lifestyle, but those who prefer the quiet life can find it: Paris has upscale single-family home sections, and 60% of the municipalities in Ile-de-France 151 have populations of less than 2,000 people. Obviously, they use their land 152 very differently than we do: we sprawl, they don't.
153
As for inner-city decline, there is no such thing in Paris. 
155
It is quite telling that Paris's closest socioeconomic equivalent to America's inner cities are the few areas that were not planned or built in the traditional French mode: namely, the suburbs where social housing was built during the 1960s and the 1970s in strict Modernist style, which, in a radical departure from French urban tradition, separates uses and housing types, thereby segregating and isolating the population. Just as the buildings in these areas resemble American ghetto housing projects, the history of these troubled suburbs resembles that of the American inner cities subjected to the midtwentieth century Urban Renewal movement, which "is now widely thought to have been a disaster for the low-income people and communities it purported to assist."
These suburbs are not familiar to tourists, but their 156 names-e.g., Seine-Saint-Denis, Seine-et-Marne and Val-d'Oise-should ring a bell for American readers who followed the November 2005 news stories about rioting among Paris's urban poor: these places were the tinderbox for social unrest. It might almost be said that they were designed for that.
Paris is not alone in this:
France's Code of Urbanism requires municipalities to adhere to the principle of "diversity of urban functions," i.e. mixed use, and to pay particular attention to the balance of jobs and housing in a given area. C. Urb. Art. L. 121-1(2).
159. See "NYC Zoning Glossary," http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/glossary.shtml# use_group.
160. See, e.g., "New York City Zoning Residence Districts," http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/ zone/zh_resdistricts.shtml (stating that the residential use groups are subdivided into the basic categories R1 through R10, each of which may be further subdivided).
161. See, e.g., "New York City Zoning Commercial Districts," http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/ zone/zh_commdistricts.shtml (stating that the numerical suffix used in some zoning classifications indicates variations in parking, floor area ratio, and other such requirements).
162. In most New York City zones, special permits, variances, and similar methods of bureaucratic waiver may allow for exceptions to one or more general rules. This is also typical of American zoning codes, whose detail and complexity make it necessary to create a bureaucratic apparatus by which at least a minimal degree of flexibility can be introduced into the system. 163. Those three are Zone N (Nature and Forests); Zone UV (Green Urban), i.e. parks and other public landscaped areas; Zone UGSU (Major Urban Services), i.e. train stations and rail lines, hospitals, waste treatment centers, water reservoirs, riverside ports, convention centers, and major centers of industrial distribution. Detailed descriptions of each zone are available at http://www.v2asp.paris.fr/v2/urbanisme/ PLU/Reglement/Default.ASP.
164. In French, "zone urbaine générale." This covers everything not covered by the previous three zones. 165 168. Law of 6 Feb. 1967. 169. The 1967 law is also responsible for certain details of the Paris skyline: it set 31 meters as the maximum height for buildings in the city center and 37 meters for buildings on the outer edges of Paris intra muros, apart from a tiny number of Modernist projects in southern Paris. 170. Paris City Hall has published charts illustrating that, with the exception of a few areas at the city's outskirts, at least 10% of Parisians walk to work, and in about one-third of Paris neighborhoods, including some of the wealthiest areas in the center-west of the city, more than 19% of people do. DIAGNOSTIC DÉPLACEMENTS, at 65, fig. 44 reforms redefined most areas not in terms of use but in terms of the density of the built environment. As any visitor to the city can confirm, the result of 169 allowing owners the freedom to use their buildings as they see fit is that the basic necessities of everyday life-stores, schools, banks, cafés, churches, doctor's offices, cultural amenities, etc.-are all within easy walking distance of residences. This dispersal of commercial activity throughout the city also means that many people's jobs are within walking distance, and indeed, many Parisians actually do walk to work. Paris exemplifies Jane Jacobs's belief 170 that "[t]he most effective mixture of uses are fine-grained: each block should bring together different uses, and not be dominated by a single activity, no matter how thriving."
171
Many American planners, accustomed to the strict control Euclidean zoning gives U.S. municipalities, might wonder how a major city could allow owners so much freedom over such a long time without descending into chaos. The expected result might be a proliferation of nuisances and of jarring buildings that conflict with the surrounding neighborhood. A visit to Paris will demonstrate that chaos has not occurred, and the reasons it has not should be familiar to any American lawyer. Uses that are or tend to be nuisances have been prevented, of course, but not by barring up front any use that might conceivably disturb the residents; instead it is done through a combination of 172. French law recognizes three types of servitudes: public servitudes (e.g. for protection of natural resources or historically significant sites, or for public utilities such as underground cables; see Code de l'Urb., Art. R. 126-1); servitudes of urbanism (e.g. imposing maximum building heights); and private servitudes (e.g. to ensure that owner A does not build a structure that impedes owner B's enjoyment of B's property). It is worth noting that as a general rule all three types address structures rather than uses. The first two types are discussed in JACQUELINE MORAND-DEVILLER, DROIT DE L'URBANISME, at 23-24 (Dalloz ed., 6th ed. 2003). Private servitudes in France function very similarly to the U.S., in that they run with the land unless the parties agree otherwise and they are enforceable by affected parties (i.e. neighbors) rather than by the government. All the public servitudes in Paris are listed in a single document, available at http://www.v2asp.paris.fr/fr/urbanisme/PLU/Annexes/ANN1.pdf.
173. I.e., the classification of major industrial and similarly large-scale, high-impact uses (train stations, hospitals, etc.) into the Major Urban Services zone. See supra note 161.
174. The few exceptions to this freedom affect a comparatively tiny number of owners: in the Paris region (Ile-de-France), most new non-residential uses that require very large spaces, and thus might create traffic, noise, or similar nuisances if left unregulated, require an agrément (official permission) in addition to construction permits. Agrément is theoretically required for construction, expansion or rehabilitation of any space used for industrial, commercial, professional, administrative, technical, scientific or teaching use. C. Urb. Art. R. 510-1. However, the exceptions nearly swallow the rule: certain municipalities, certain uses (e.g. retail stores, see Art. 510-6-I(2), and movie theaters, see Art. 510-6-I(2)), all industrial and warehouse properties under 5000m (53,820 sq. ft.), and all other non-residential uses occupying less than 1000m administrative action, e.g., nuisance suits or environmental enforcement. In other words, Paris uses a system that roughly parallels the one most American states used prior to the advent of Euclidean zoning: it explicitly prevents a few obvious nuisances or hazards, and it gives affected parties the option of enforcing servitudes or shutting down less-obvious nuisances themselves by bringing suit. Beyond those limits, unless an owner buys a copropriété (condominium) with contractually agreed restrictions, she is free to use her property as a home, an office, an art studio, or whatever else she pleases.
174
Paris testifies to the truth of Jacobs's statement that "[i]ntricate minglings of different uses in cities are not a form of chaos. On the contrary, they represent a complex and highly developed form of order."
175
As for the relative absence of unsightly buildings, this is at least in part due to the fact that Paris has historically tended to zone for structures rather than uses. Between 1607 and 1902, zoning was used to set maximum building heights, to regulate building materials due to fire risk, and to impose 178. Decree of 13 Aug. 1902. 179. Articles UG.10 and UGSU.10 describe colored lines on the city's planning maps that "define, according to their color, the vertical height of the building envelope applicable to buildings that front on the street, and, according to their type (continuous line, dotted line . . .), the shape of the roofline." Paris City Hall, Local Urban Plan Definitions: Filet de couleur, available at http://www.v1.paris.fr/V2/ urbanisme/PLU/Lexique_PLU.asp. The height of buildings with no setback from the street is generally still, as in the eighteenth century, defined relative to the width of the street (including sidewalks). Figures 5-9 in the following document illustrate the relationship between street width and the maximum façade height of buildings fronting on streets, while figure 10 illustrates additional allowable rooflines and total heights. http://www.v1.paris.fr/fr/Urbanisme/PLU/Reglement/Reglement_Figures.pdf.
180. Safety and aesthetic concerns can combine: the classic Paris roof, with its Mansard style and graceful tilt back from the façade, is an example. This roof style derives from the Royal Declaration of 10 April 1783 and the Patent Letters of 28 August 1784, which regulated the angle at which rooftop rooms had to lean back from the façade. These laws were made because people whose poverty relegated them to living on rooftops built precarious dwellings there, and in addition to being unattractive, there was concern that the flimsy structures might fall into the street; tilting them back made them both less visible and less likely to fall.
181. Façade restrictions are not only architectural in nature: for example, antennae and satellite dishes are only permitted on roofs and must be set back far enough to make them impossible to see from any public space, while air conditioning units must be placed so as to limit their visual impact. Paris Zoning Code, Art. UG11. 1.3(3) .
182. Paris Zoning Code, Art. UG11.1.3 (stating that new construction must integrate with the existing neighborhood, taking account of proportion, scale, and façades of surrounding buildings, but specifically stating that new construction can be contemporary in style). Defining maximum building heights according to the width of the street on which the buildings face, as Paris has long done, could be based on safety concerns such as reducing traffic congestion by limiting the number of people living on narrow streets, but it also has the aesthetic result of inciting all the owners on the street to make their buildings the maximum, and thus the same, height.
186. Even La Défense is mixed use, with 150,000 jobs and 20,000 inhabitants. See the web site of the Hauts-de-Seine county council, http://www.hauts-de-seine.net/portal/site/hds, click on Cadre de Vie, then Urbanisme, then La Défense.
187. Paris City Hall, Local Urbanism Plan, Planning and Durable Development, Ch. 1 (Improving the Quality of Life for All Parisians in a Lasting Way), at 3, http://www.v2asp.paris.fr/fr/urbanisme/PLU/ PADD/PADD_CadreVie.pdf. Note, "durable development" is a literal translation of a French term describing city, regional and national planning that aims to coordinate economic progress, social welfare, and environmental protection.
188. Id. at 6.
constructed specifically for such structures. The point of separating structure types is to create architecturally coherent neighborhoods: Paris intra muros is built largely from limestone and plaster, or concrete treated to look like plaster, and with few exceptions it caps building heights at the width of the 184 street plus a variable but small number of meters. La Défense, meanwhile, 185 is all tall buildings in steel and glass.
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Even in the context of plans to improve quality of life for Paris residents, city authorities remain preoccupied with structures, particularly their beauty and character: "the harmony of the city, of its colors, shapes, and materials . . . the specificity of its neighborhoods, the coherence of their organization . . . [and] the nature of the shops that increase the charm of Paris streets necessitate particular attention and careful work on the part of constructionindustry actors." This approach could be described as a vision of the city 187 as a work of art that is perpetually in progress; the question is not where unwanted uses should be banished to, but what architectural techniques can be used to harmoniously blend all uses into the surrounding landscape. Construction or rehabilitation of industrial shipping ports on the river Seine, for example, "must be accompanied with a particular effort to integrate them into this sensitive site . . . [and] must be compatible with the continuity and quality of leisurely walks along the banks of the Seine." In a nutshell, Paris 188 city planning lets owners put their property to virtually any use they want, so long as they do so within structures that are regulated to enhance safety, beauty, and quality of life for everyone. Aesthetically pleasing mixed-use neighborhoods are the natural result. economics, segregation, and quality of life. They will be treated together.
Though an examination of the Paris economy is beyond the scope of this article, it should be clear by now that since sprawl has not happened in Paris, the associated economic impact-such as massive infrastructure expenses and the displacement of jobs to areas many people have trouble getting to-is a non-issue there. Again, it is only in the Modernist social-housing wastelands outside the city proper that people are physically isolated from economic activity. The government recently responded to that problem by designating every neighborhood in France that is characterized by deteriorating residential buildings and "a marked imbalance between housing and jobs" as a 192 "Sensitive Urban Zone," which qualifies businesses relocating there for a subsidized incentive package. In effect, the government is trying to make 205. For example, the Gotham Court complex, built in 1850 to house 140 poor families, consisted of tenements each of which faced an alley and "contained two dwellings measuring ten feet by fourteen feet . . . subdivided into two rooms, both without cross ventilation." PLUNZ, supra note 177, at 6. altered building structures. The city's control over building structure enables it to impose minimum standards, like the 1902 rule setting the minimum area of an interior courtyard at thirty square meters, that have sometimes 202 modified the pattern of desirable apartments: those facing the courtyard were left for servants and the poor in pre-1902 buildings whose cramped courtyards inhibited access to fresh air, but in post-1902 buildings, particularly with the rise of street noise due to cars, street-facing apartments became cheaper and courtyard-facing ones more expensive.
The advent of elevators likewise 203 shifted the pattern without destroying it; for example, since the city's planning regulations still impose some form of Mansard-style roof in most districts, and thus top-floor rooms whose ceilings follow the roofline, the top floor alone 204 may not be suitable for American-style penthouse apartments, but developers can give upper floors a different value in other ways. They can make them more desirable by turning the top two stories into a loft with a mezzanine under the roofline, placing less desirable apartments underneath; or they can keep them cheaper by focusing their construction or renovation budget on the apartments below, which become correspondingly more desirable and expensive. This pattern contrasts powerfully with the American approach: a century before the ill-fated Urban Renewal movement, New York City developers were already building poorly-constructed residential developments consisting of a concentrated mass of identical homes targeted exclusively towards the poor-that is, slums. Euclidean zoning, which New York City invented in 205 1916, simply provided a legal framework that set this pattern of segregation in stone by providing municipalities with a mechanism to prevent future development that did not follow the principle of separating uses and housing types, and, by extension, socioeconomic groups.
In contrast, avoiding socioeconomic segregation is an express goal of France's Code of Urbanism, which requires city plans and municipal mapsthe rough equivalent of American zoning maps-to adhere to the principle of residential areas does not, of course, imply a complete intermingling of all possible social classes in one building or even one neighborhood. However, in Paris, a notable degree of socioeconomic diversity exists even in the most expensive areas-that is, even in neighborhoods whose residents presumably have the resources, knowledge and clout to exclude unwanted neighbors to the greatest extent the law allows. The Ile Saint-Louis, originally built up in the 17th century as mansions and villas for the wealthy, is now largely Saint-Louis come in a range of sizes and some apartments are available for rent, the income mix is even greater than this price range would suggest.
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As for quality of life, "France . . . meets or exceeds the United States on many measures of health and well-being. French life expectancy is higher, child mortality is lower, and education levels are about the same." Paris factors may be interacting to give French students such good results, their average scores on international comparisons are not dragged down by large numbers of seriously underperforming peers, since in France more lowerincome children get a good education-simply because they get the same education as their wealthier neighbors.
B. French Legal and Political Structures That Make This Possible
While the political and legal framework underlying land use in France is different than in the U.S., similar principles underpin both systems. An indepth discussion is beyond the scope of this article, but a few points may help illustrate that Paris's approach to land use is not totally alien to American ways. At least one scholar has noted that "[t]he word 'police' as used in 'police power' may have . . . entered English from French," a point 225. C. Urb. Art. L. 510-1(III) and R. 510-6 (requiring official permission-a complex bureaucratic process-for development of commercial, industrial, and similar uses in Ile-de-France, but exempting development in certain targeted areas).
226. Glendening, supra note 84, at 1494. 227. E.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Com., 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987) (holding it to be a taking if the municipality conditions a building permit on the granting of a public easement across the owner's private beach).
228. This may be part of the reason such lawsuits are much less common in France. One study indicates that suits by developers seeking zoning approval are about nine times less common than in the U. In many American zoning cases, the key argument is that the ordinance so reduces the owner's property value that it amounts to a taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
The French concept of 227 expropriation is similar to takings, but it is simpler and in some ways more favorable to owners. For example, if the owner and the state cannot agree 228 on a purchase price, the decision will be made by a judge, as in the U.S., but the costs of that civil action are borne entirely by the state regardless of the outcome. The state must also pay moving costs for those displaced by the 229 expropriation and incidental damages such as lost rental income, and 230 231 displaced owners have preferential status for certain benefits that help mitigate the impact of their property loss, such as low-interest construction loans.
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And while the concept of expropriation does not apply to acts by the state that merely diminish the value of property without physically affecting it, such 233 acts are by definition much less common: what typically provokes takings lawsuits in America is rezoning a parcel to a less profitable use, but that cannot often happen in a country that barely zones for use at all. The other common trigger for takings lawsuits in the U.S. is the placing of uniquely onerous conditions on construction permits, but the French Code of 234 Urbanism prohibits conditioning building permits on anything other than mitigating risks that the construction itself would pose to public safety or health.
As such, many widely cited U.S. land use cases would probably 235 never have arisen in France. The key political difference in French land use law is that the power to regulate land use is diffused between the nation, each region, and each municipality.
In is quite different from America's, but for those interested in exploring how a similar approach to zoning can be implemented within a federal system more structurally similar to the U.S., Germany offers an intriguing example.
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V. CONCLUSION
The French example seems to demonstrate that proponents of New Urbanism and Smart Growth are right: a planning process that incorporates these principles "produce[s] an urbanism that is fundamentally unlike conventional sprawl, featuring urban areas that are compact, pedestrianoriented, and containing mixed uses. It . . . produce[s] viable urban settings that people . . . want to live in, thereby reducing pressure to consume natural 242 habitats and convert more land to low-density sprawl."
The unfortunate 243 experience of Paris's Urban Renewal-style social housing, meanwhile, demonstrates that even in a country with a renowned social safety net and an excellent, centrally-funded education system, single-use, socioeconomically segregated neighborhoods have a devastating impact on their residents in both human and economic terms. In other words, city planning really does matter: welfare and more equitable funding for education cannot compensate for an urban landscape that is designed to make people fail. "Smart Growth [advocates] must better engage the public, stakeholder groups, and governmental institutions in understanding the relationship between land use issues and our overall quality 244. Glendening, supra note 84, at 1507. 245. Kleppel, supra note 3, at 47. of life." Clearly, legal and political changes must take place in order for 244 this solution to be workable in the United States. The alternative, however, is to maintain a status quo that is at odds with all parts of the political spectrum: Euclidean zoning violates conservative principles by distorting the market and restricting property rights to an absurd degree, and it offends liberal ones by perpetuating America's decades-long slide into stark racial and socioeconomic segregation. In most American municipalities, "conformity with the [zoning] ordinance has . . . become an end rather than a means of achieving a better quality of life or addressing some greater community vision." It is time for this to change.
